C.R.S. § 42-4-1708

Traffic infractions - proper court for hearing, burden of proof - appeal - collateral attack.

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42-4-1708. Traffic infractions - proper court for hearing, burden of proof -
appeal - collateral attack. (1) Every hearing in county court for the adjudication of a
traffic infraction, as provided by this article, shall be held before a county court
magistrate appointed pursuant to part 5 of article 6 of title 13, C.R.S., or before a
county judge acting as a magistrate; except that, whenever a crime and a class A or
class B traffic infraction or a crime and both such class A and class B traffic
infractions are charged in the same summons and complaint, all charges shall be
made returnable before a judge or magistrate having jurisdiction over the crime and
the rules of criminal procedure shall apply. Nothing in this part 17 or in part 5 of
article 6 of title 13, C.R.S., shall be construed to prevent a court having jurisdiction
over a criminal charge relating to traffic law violations from lawfully entering a
judgment on a case dealing with a class A or class B traffic infraction.

 (2) When a court of competent jurisdiction determines that a person charged
with a class 1 or class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense is guilty of a lesser-included
offense which is a class A or class B traffic infraction, the court may enter a
judgment as to such lesser charge.

 (3) The burden of proof shall be upon the people, and the traffic magistrate
shall enter judgment in favor of the defendant unless the people prove the liability
of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The district attorney or the district
attorney's deputy may, in the district attorney's discretion, enter traffic infraction
cases for the purpose of attempting a negotiated plea or a stipulation to deferred
prosecution or deferred judgment and sentence but shall not be required to so
enter by any person, court, or law, nor shall the district attorney represent the state
at hearings conducted by a magistrate or a county judge acting as a magistrate on
class A or class B traffic infraction matters. The magistrate or county judge acting
as a magistrate shall be permitted to call and question any witness and shall also
act as the fact finder at hearings on traffic infraction matters.

 (4) Appeal from final judgment on a traffic infraction matter shall be taken
to the district court for the county in which the magistrate or judge acting as
magistrate is located.

 (5) (a) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (5),
no person against whom a judgment has been entered for a traffic infraction as
defined in section 42-4-1701 (3)(a) shall collaterally attack the validity of that
judgment unless such attack is commenced within six months after the date of
entry of the judgment.

 (b) In recognition of the difficulties attending the litigation of stale claims
and the potential for frustrating various statutory provisions directed at repeat
offenders, former offenders, and habitual offenders, the only exceptions to the time
limitations specified in subsection (5)(a) of this section are:

 (I) A case in which the court entering judgment did not have jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the alleged infraction;

 (II) A case in which the court entering judgment did not have jurisdiction over
the person of the violator;

 (III) Where the court hearing the collateral attack finds by a preponderance
of the evidence that the failure to seek relief within the applicable time period was
caused by an adjudication of incompetence or by commitment or certification of the
violator to an institution for treatment as a person with a mental health disorder; or

 (IV) Where the court hearing the collateral attack finds that the failure to
seek relief within the applicable time period was the result of circumstances
amounting to justifiable excuse or excusable neglect.

 Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2421, § 1, effective
January 1, 1995. L. 2006: (5)(b)(III) amended, p. 1409, § 81, effective August 7. L.
2017: IP(5)(b) and (5)(b)(III) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1381, § 308, effective
May 25.

 Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-4-1505.3 as it existed
prior to 1994.

 Cross references: For provisions concerning limitation for collateral attack
upon trial judgment, see § 16-5-402; for penalties for class A and class B traffic
infractions and class 1 and class 2 misdemeanor traffic offenses, see § 42-4-1701
(3)(a).

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