356 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. 2011)

Haygood v. De Escabedo

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
════════════
No.
09-0377
════════════
Aaron Glenn Haygood, Petitioner,
v.
Margarita Garza De Escabedo, Respondent
════════════════════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from
the
Court of Appeals for the
Twelfth District of Texas
════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Argued September 16, 2010
Justice Hecht delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Jefferson, Justice Wainwright, Justice Green, Justice Johnson, Justice
Willett, and Justice Guzman
joined.
Justice Lehrmann filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Justice
Medina joined.
Damages for wrongful personal injury include the reasonable expenses for
necessary medical care, but it has become increasingly difficult to determine
what expenses are reasonable. Health care providers set charges they maintain
are reasonable while agreeing to reimbursement at much lower rates determined by
insurers to be reasonable, resulting in great disparities between amounts billed
and payments accepted. Section 41.0105 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code, enacted in 2003 as part of a wide-ranging package of tort-reform
measures,1 provides that �recovery of medical or
health care expenses incurred is limited to the amount actually paid or incurred
by or on behalf of the claimant.�2 We agree with the court of appeals3 that this statute limits recovery, and
consequently the evidence at trial, to expenses that the provider has a legal
right to be paid.
I
Aaron Glenn Haygood sued Margarita Garza De
Escabedo for injuries he sustained when the car he was
driving collided with Escabedo�s minivan as she was
pulling out of a grocery store parking lot. Haygood�s
injuries required surgeries on his neck and shoulder. Both were successful, but
some impairment remains.
Twelve health care providers billed Haygood a
total of $110,069.12, but he was covered by Medicare Part B, which generally
�pays no more for . . . medical and other
health services than the �reasonable charge� for such service.�4 Criteria for determining reasonable
charges include customary charges for similar services and prevailing charges in
the same locality for similar services.5 Federal law prohibits health care
providers who agree to treat Medicare patients from charging more than Medicare
has determined to be reasonable.6 Accordingly Haygood�s health care providers adjusted their bills with
credits of $82,329.69, leaving a total of $27,739.43. At the time of trial,
$13,257.41 had been paid, and $14,482.02 was due.7
Invoking section 41.0105, Escabedo moved to
exclude evidence of medical expenses other than those paid or owed. Haygood, asserting the collateral source rule, moved to
exclude evidence of any amounts other than those billed, and of any adjustments
and payments. The trial court denied Escabedo�s motion
and granted Haygood�s. At trial, Haygood offered evidence from each of his health care
providers that the charges billed were reasonable and the services necessary.
The jury found that Escabedo�s negligence caused the
accident and that Haygood�s damages were $110,069.12
for past medical expenses, $7,000 for future medical expenses, $24,500 for past
pain and mental anguish, and $3,000 for future pain and mental anguish. The
trial court overruled Escabedo�s objection to an award
of past medical expenses in excess of those paid or owed and rendered judgment
on the verdict.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that section 41.0105 precluded
evidence or recovery of expenses that �neither the claimant nor anyone acting on
his behalf will ultimately be liable for paying�.8 The court suggested a remittitur of the amount of the health care providers�
adjustments,9 which Haygood
did not accept, and the case was remanded for a new trial.10 The court noted that two other courts
had reached conflicting decisions.11 We granted Haygood�s petition for review to resolve the
conflict.12
II
The Legislature enacted section 41.0105 against a backdrop of health care
pricing practices and the collateral source rule. We discuss each before turning
to the statutory text and its consequences.
A
Charges for health care, once based on the provider�s costs and profit
margin, have more recently been driven by government regulation and negotiations
with private insurers.13 A two-tiered structure has evolved:
�list� or �full� rates sometimes charged to uninsured patients,14 but frequently uncollected,15 and reimbursement rates for patients
covered by government and private insurance.16 We recently observed that �[f]ew patients today ever pay a hospital�s full charges, due to
the prevalence of Medicare, Medicaid, HMOs, and private insurers who pay
discounted rates.�17 Hospitals, like health care providers in
general,18 �feel financial pressure to set their
�full charges� . . . as high as possible, because the higher the �full
charge� the greater the reimbursement amount the hospital receives since
reimbursement rates are often set as a percentage of the hospital�s �full
charge.��19
Although reimbursement rates have been determined to be reasonable under
Medicare or other programs, or have been reached by agreements between willing
providers and willing insurers, providers nevertheless maintain that list rates
are also reasonable. Providers commonly bill insured patients at list rates,
with reductions to reimbursement rates shown separately as adjustments or
credits.20 Portions of bills showing only list
charges are admitted in evidence, with proof of reasonableness coming from
testimony by the provider, or more often, by affidavit of the provider or the
provider�s records custodian as permitted by section 18.001 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code.21
In all these respects, the present case is entirely typical. The
providers testified the charges billed to Haygood were
reasonable, even though those charges were four times the amount they were
entitled to collect.
B
As a general principle, compensatory damages, like medical expenses, �are
intended to make the plaintiff �whole� for any losses resulting from the
defendant�s interference with the plaintiff�s rights.�22 The collateral source rule is an
exception.23 Long a part of the common law of
Texas24 and other jurisdictions,25 the rule precludes any reduction in a
tortfeasor�s liability because of benefits received by
the plaintiff from someone else � a collateral source. Thus, for example,
insurance payments to or for a plaintiff are not credited to damages awarded
against the defendant.26 �The theory behind the collateral source
rule is that a wrongdoer should not have the benefit of insurance independently
procured by the injured party, and to which the wrongdoer was not
privy.�27
Haygood contends that an adjustment in billed
medical charges required by an insurer is a collateral benefit covered by the
rule. We disagree. The benefit of insurance to the insured is the payment of
charges owed to the health care provider. An adjustment in the amount of those
charges to arrive at the amount owed is a benefit to the insurer, one it obtains
from the provider for itself, not for the insured. Haygood argues that the adjustment reduces the insured�s
liability, but the insured�s liability is for payment of taxes, if a government
insurer, or premiums, if a private insurer, and for any deductible. Any effect
of an adjustment on such liability is at most indirect and is not measured by
the amount of the adjustment.
The collateral source rule reflects �the position of the law that a
benefit that is directed to the injured party should not be shifted so as to
become a windfall for the tortfeasor.�28 To impose liability for medical expenses
that a health care provider is not entitled to charge does not prevent a
windfall to a tortfeasor; it creates one for a
claimant, as we recently wrote in Daughters of Charity Health Services of
Waco v. Linnstaedter.29 Linnstaedter
and Bolen sued Jones for injuries they sustained in a motor vehicle accident,
claiming damages for the full amount of their hospital expenses.30 The hospital was reimbursed part of
those expenses by workers� compensation insurance and was precluded from seeking
payment of the unpaid balance from its patients by the Workers� Compensation
Act.31 Nevertheless, the hospital asserted a
lien on any damages the patients recovered against Jones.32 Jones settled with the patients and paid
the hospital the balance on its bill to discharge the lien.33 The patients then sued the hospital for
the amount of that payment.34 We held that the hospital�s claim to
part of the patients� recovery against Jones was a claim against the patients
themselves that was precluded by the Act.35 Furthermore, we said, to allow the
hospital to recover more than the reimbursement allowed by the Act would defeat
its purpose of controlling medical costs.36 But the patients had sued Jones for �the
full medical charges billed by the hospital rather than the reduced amount paid
by their compensation carrier�.37 �[A] recovery of medical expenses in
that amount�, we said, �would be a windfall; as the hospital had no claim for
these amounts against the patients, they in turn had no claim for them against
Jones.�38 Moreover, we noted, �[t]his rule has
since been codified [in Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code � 41.0105]�.39
Consistent with our views in Daughters of Charity, we hold that
the common-law collateral source rule does not allow recovery as damages of
medical expenses a health care provider is not entitled to charge.40
C
With this background, we turn to the text of section 41.0105, which
states simply: �In addition to any other limitation under law, recovery of
medical or health care expenses incurred is limited to the amount actually paid
or incurred by or on behalf of the claimant.�41 Haygood argues
that a claimant incurs the full charges billed by a provider, even if the
provider is required by law or contract to reduce those charges because the
claimant is covered by insurance, and therefore the statute imposes no limit on
recovery. In his view, �actually� modifies only �paid�, or if it also modifies
the second �incurred�, then the first �incurred� and �actually incurred� mean
the same thing. Either way, the sentence reads: �recovery of
. . . expenses incurred is limited to the amount
. . . incurred�. This is a meaningless tautology. �Statutory language
should not be read as pointless if it is reasonably susceptible of another
construction.�42 An amount
�actually paid� unquestionably means one for which payment has been made. And it
is reasonable to read �actually� as also modifying �incurred�,43 referring to expenses that are to be
paid, not merely included in an invoice and then adjusted by required credits.
Thus, �actually paid and incurred� means expenses that have been or will be
paid, and excludes the difference between such amount
and charges the service provider bills but has no right to be paid.
Haygood argues that this construction is
inconsistent with our decision in Black v. American Bankers Insurance
Co.,44 but it is not. Black sued his health
insurer, American Bankers, for medical bills, a portion of which had been paid
by Medicare.45 The policy covered expenses Black
�actually incurred�, and American Bankers argued that Black had not actually
incurred the expenses paid by Medicare because he was never liable for
them.46 We held that the issue had been
�resolved by the stipulation of the parties, which recites that plaintiff
�incurred the reasonable, necessary and customary charges by said Hospital
. . . as shown by the bill��.47 We added: �Further, as a matter of law,
we hold that when plaintiff entered the hospital and received its services,
there was created an implied contract to pay for same, and he was liable therefor until he or someone else paid the bill.�48 Black differs from the present
case, not only because it involved the construction of a policy and primary
insurance issues, but also because Black�s entire bill was actually paid while
most of Haygood�s bill was adjusted with credits the
service provider was required to apply.
Haygood concedes that in Daughters of
Charity,49 �[t]his court has previously implied
that � 41.0105 affects the recovery of medical expenses�,50 but our decision in that case was more
than an implication. As already explained, we held that a tortfeasor is not liable to a health care provider or its
patients for medical expenses the patients were not required to pay the
provider. For the patients to recover such expenses from the tortfeasor �would be a windfall�.51 Our holding, we
said, had been �codified� in section 41.0105.52 The effect of section 41.0105 is thus to
prevent a �windfall� to a claimant. Our decision in Daughters of Charity
does not merely imply that Haygood�s argument is
without merit; it rejects the argument outright.
Finally, Haygood argues that if the Legislature
had intended to limit recovery, it would also have had to amend section 18.001
of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which states in
part:
Unless a controverting affidavit is filed as provided by this
section, an affidavit that the amount a person charged for a service was
reasonable at the time and place that the service was provided and that the
service was necessary is sufficient evidence to support a finding of fact by
judge or jury that the amount charged was reasonable or that the service was
necessary.53
But this statute is purely
procedural, providing for the use of affidavits to streamline proof of the
reasonableness and necessity of medical expenses. The statute does not establish
that billed charges are reasonable and necessary; on the contrary, it expressly
contemplates that the issue can be controverted by
affidavit, which could aver that only the amount actually paid was
reasonable.
Accordingly, we hold that section 41.0105 limits a claimant�s recovery of
medical expenses to those which have been or must be paid by or for the
claimant. All the courts of appeals that have addressed the issue have reached
the same conclusion,54 although as we have said, there has been
disagreement over the effect of section 41.0105 on the evidence at trial, the
issue to which we now turn.
D
Haygood argues that even if section 41.0105
precludes recovery of expenses a provider has no right to be paid, evidence of
such expenses is nonetheless admissible at trial. �Evidence which is not
relevant is inadmissible.�55 This includes evidence of a claim of
damages that are not compensable.56 Since a claimant is not entitled to
recover medical charges that a provider is not entitled to be paid, evidence of
such charges is irrelevant to the issue of damages.
The question remains whether such evidence has any other probative value.
A few courts in other jurisdictions have expressed concern that limiting the
evidence to amounts that have been or must be paid provides the jury an unfairly
low benchmark with which to gauge the seriousness of the plaintiff�s injuries
and awarding non-economic damages, such as for physical pain and mental
anguish.57 But there is no unfairness if
reimbursable amounts are reasonable for the services provided. In this case,
Medicare, as required by federal law, determined that the charges it reimbursed
were reasonable, given customary and prevailing rates where Haygood was treated. Even so, Haygood argues, if he were
uninsured, his medical expenses would not be subject to adjustments or credits,
and evidence of more expensive treatment would suggest to the jury that his
injuries were more serious. It is unfair, he contends, to treat insured and
uninsured claimants differently. Haygood�s solution is
to allow the jury to consider evidence of non-recoverable economic damages in
setting non-economic damages. But we think that any relevance of such evidence
is substantially outweighed by the confusion it is likely to generate, and
therefore the evidence must be excluded.58
Haygood argues that if the Legislature had
intended to allow evidence of amounts actually paid to be offered at trial, it
would also have had to amend sections 41.012 and 18.001 of the Civil Practice
and Remedies Code. Section 41.012 states that �[i]n a
trial to a jury, the court shall instruct the jury with regard to Sections
41.001, 41.003, 41.010, and 41.011�59 � that is, the jury must be instructed
on the standards for recovery of exemplary damages and the factors to be
considered in setting any award. But an instruction on the limit on recovery of
medical expenses would be necessary only if evidence of amounts charged were
admitted along with evidence of amounts paid or to be paid. The absence of a
statutorily required jury instruction suggests that the Legislature intended
either that juries not be given the only evidence relevant to recovery or that
they be given only evidence relevant to recovery. Since the jury cannot
determine what expenses were necessary absent evidence relevant to recovery, we
think the Legislature must have intended the latter. As for section 18.001, as
already explained, it merely provides for any dispute over reasonable and
necessary expenses to be teed up by affidavit, and says nothing about whether
unpaid expenses are reasonable and necessary.
The dissent argues that the jury should consider only evidence of charges
billed, without adjustments or credits required by insurers. Evidence of
expenses paid or to be paid, the dissent urges, should be presented to the trial
court post-verdict by the defendant. A fundamental rule is that �[t]o recover
damages, the burden is on the plaintiff to produce evidence from which the jury
may reasonably infer that the damages claimed resulted from the defendant�s
conduct.�60 The only justification the dissent has
for shifting the burden of proof to the defendant is that section 41.0105�s
limitation on damages is like the monetary caps imposed by other statutes. But
imposing a monetary cap never requires the court to resolve a disputed fact;
limiting the recovery of expenses to those actually paid often does. For one
thing, parties may dispute whether expenses are necessarily related to a
plaintiff�s injuries. In Texarkana Memorial Hospital v. Murdock, for
example, we held that there was evidence that only some but not all of the
plaintiff�s medical expenses found by the jury were related to her
injuries.61 The issue could not simply be redetermined by the trial court; the case had to be retried
to the jury.62 Also, the parties may disagree whether
any part of some providers� charges is reasonable. If the jury awards less than
the total of all charges, the trial court may have no way of knowing which
charges the jury found reasonable and which it did not. In all these situations,
a requirement that the trial court resolve disputed facts in determining the
damages to be awarded violates the constitutional right to trial by jury. �In
enacting a statute, it is presumed that . . .
compliance with the constitutions of this state and the United States is
intended; . . . a just and reasonable result is intended; [and] a
result feasible of execution is intended . . . .�63 The dissent�s
construction of section 41.0105 is contrary to all three
presumptions.
Accordingly, we hold that only evidence of recoverable medical expenses
is admissible at trial. We disapprove the cases that have reached conflicting
decisions.64 Of course, the collateral source rule
continues to apply to such expenses, and the jury should not be told that they
will be covered in whole or in part by insurance. Nor should the jury be told
that a health care provider adjusted its charges because of
insurance.
* *
*
We agree with the opinion of the court of appeals, and therefore its
judgment is
Affirmed.
Nathan L. Hecht
Justice
Opinion Delivered: July 1,
2011
1 Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, � 13.08, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847,
889.
2 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code
� 41.0105.
3 283 S.W.3d 3 (Tex. App.�Tyler
2009).
4 42 C.F.R. � 405.501(a).
5 42 C.F.R. � 405.502(a).
6 42
U.S.C. � 1395cc(a)(1)-(2).
7 The
record indicates that almost all of what has been paid was by
insurance.
8 283 S.W.3d at 7.
9 The
court of appeals miscalculated the adjustments by $35. Id. at 5, 8.
10 Id. at 8.
11
Id. at 7 (citing Irving Holdings, Inc. v. Brown, 274 S.W.3d
926, 931-933 (Tex. App.�Dallas 2009, pet. denied), and Gore v. Faye, 253
S.W.3d 785, 789-790 (Tex. App.�Amarillo 2008, no pet.)). Since then, two other
courts have followed Brown. Arango v. Davila, Nos.
13-09-00470-CV, 13-09-00627-CV, 2011 WL 1900189, at *9 (Tex. App.�Corpus Christi
May 19, 2011, no pet. h.); Frontera
Sanitation, L.L.C. v. Cervantes, No. 08-08-00330-CV, 2011 WL 1157559, at *5
(Tex. App.�El Paso Mar. 30, 2011, no pet. h.).
12 53 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 562 (Apr. 9,
2010).
13
See Keith T. Peters, What Have We Here? The Need for
Transparent Pricing and Quality Information in Health Care: Creation of an SEC
for Health Care, 10 J. Health Care
L. & Pol�y 363, 366 (2007) (�The price of a particular provider�s
services depends on many factors including geography, experience, location,
government payment methods, and the desire to make a profit. Hospital prices are
supposed to be determined by the cost of providing care. However, the
reimbursement rates for federal programs such as Medicare and Medicaid drive the
list price of health care.�) (footnotes
omitted).
14
See
Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing Of U.S. Hospital
Services: Chaos Behind A Veil Of Secrecy, 25 Health Aff. 57, 62 (2006) (�Partly
under pressure from consumers and lawmakers and partly on their own volition,
many hospitals now have means-tested discounts off their chargemasters for uninsured patients, which bring the prices
charged the uninsured closer to those paid by commercial insurers or even below.
Some very poor patients, of course, have received hospital care free of charge
all along, on a purely charitable basis.�) (footnote
omitted).
15
See George A. Nation III, Obscene Contracts: The Doctrine of
Unconscionability and Hospital Billing of the
Uninsured, 94 Ky. L.J. 101,
120 (2005-06) (�While all uninsured patients are expected to pay the hospital�s
�full charges,� it appears that in fact less than five percent actually pay the
full charge.�).
16
See Peters, supra note 13, at 366 (�The �price� of health
care . . . can be divided into two prices.
First, there is the list price[,] . . . similar to the sticker price
one might find when purchasing a new car � it serves only as a beginning point
for the negotiations, for those who have the market share to negotiate.
. . . From these list prices, private insurers, Medicaid and Medicare,
and other groups negotiate discounts to arrive at
. . . the �actual price.� Although the list price of health
care varies widely across different regions of the country, the actual price
paid is relatively static.�) (footnotes
omitted).
17 Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of Waco v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 410 (Tex. 2007) (citing
Nation, supra note 15, at 104 (�[A] hospital�s �regular rates,� �full
charges,� or �list prices� . . . are generally at least double and may
be up to eight times what the hospital would accept as payment in full for the
same services from Medicare, Medicaid, HMOs, or private insurers. The labels for
these charges, �regular,� �full,� or �list,� are misleading, because in fact
they are actually paid by less than five percent of patients nationally.�)
(footnotes omitted)).
18
See, e.g., Vencor, Inc. v. Nat�l States Ins. Co.,
303 F.3d 1024, 1029 n.9 (9th Cir. 2002) (�It is worth noting that in a world in
which patients are covered by Medicare and various other kinds of medical
insurance schemes that negotiate rates with providers, providers� supposed
ordinary or standard rates may be paid by a small minority of
patients.�).
19
See Nation, supra note 15, at
119.
20
See James McGrath, Overcharging the Uninsured in Hospitals:
Shifting a Greater Share of Uncompensated Medical Care Costs to the Federal
Government, 26 Quinnipiac L.
Rev. 173, 183 (2007) (�Hospitals usually bill all patients at the list
price for the same service, and then significantly discount these rates for
third-party payers who contract with the hospital.�); Reinhardt, supra
note 14, at 59 (�Typically, a hospital will submit, for all of its patients,
detailed bills based on its chargemaster, even to
patients covered by Medicare. An advantage of these bills is that at least in
principle, patients can check whether all of the supplies and services listed on
the bill were actually delivered. A disadvantage, for hospitals, is that these
bills are very lengthy and add up to large totals that do not bear any
systematic relationship to the amounts third-party payers actually pay them for
the listed services.�).
21 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
� 18.001(b) (�Unless a controverting affidavit is
filed as provided by this section, an affidavit that the amount a person charged
for a service was reasonable at the time and place that the service was provided
and that the service was necessary is sufficient evidence to support a finding
of fact by judge or jury that the amount charged was reasonable or that the
service was necessary.�); id. � 18.001(c) (�The affidavit must: (1)
be taken before an officer with authority to administer oaths; (2) be made by:
(A) the person who provided the service; or (B) the person in charge of records
showing the service provided and charge made; and (3) include an itemized
statement of the service and charge.�).
22 Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 16 (Tex. 1994).
23
See Restatement (Second)
of Torts � 920A cmt. b (1977) (�Payments made or benefits conferred by other
sources are known as collateral-source benefits. They do not have the effect of
reducing the recovery against the defendant. The injured party�s net loss may
have been reduced correspondingly, and to the extent that the defendant is
required to pay the total amount there may be a double compensation for a part
of the plaintiff�s injury.�).
24 Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Kidd, 997
S.W.2d 265, 274 (Tex. 1999); Brown v. Am. Transfer & Storage Co., 601
S.W.2d 931, 934 (Tex. 1980); Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Levi & Bro.,
59 Tex. 674, 676 (1883).
25
See Restatement
(Second)of Torts � 920A(2) (�Payments made
to or benefits conferred on the injured party from other sources are not
credited against the tortfeasor�s liability, although
they cover all or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.�).
26
Mid-Century, 997 S.W.2d at 274 (�The collateral source rule bars a
wrongdoer from offsetting his liability by insurance benefits independently
procured by the injured party.�); Levi, 59 Tex. at 676 (�The insurer and
the defendant are not joint tort-feasors or joint
debtors so as to make the payment or satisfaction by the former operate to the
benefit of the latter; nor is there any legal privity
between the defendant and the insurer so as to give the former the right to
avail itself of a payment by the latter. The policy of insurance is collateral
to the remedy against the defendant, and was procured solely by the plaintiff at
his expense, and to the procurement of which the defendant was in no way contributory . . . . It cannot be said that
the plaintiff took out the policy in the interest or behalf of the defendant,
nor is there any legal principle which seems to require that it be ultimately
appropriated to the defendant�s use and benefit.�) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27
Brown, 601 S.W.2d at 934.
28 Restatement (Second) of Torts
� 920A cmt. b.
29 226 S.W.3d 409, 412 (Tex.
2007).
30 Id. at 410, 412.
31
Id. at 410-411.
32 Id. at 410.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35
Daughters of Charity, 226 S.W.3d at 411 (�[A] lien against a
patient�s tort recovery is just as much a claim against the patient as if it
were filed against the patient's house, car, or bank account.�).
36
Id. at 412 (�Further, granting hospitals a lien in excess of the
established guidelines for fair and reasonable rates would frustrate the
Legislature�s effort to achieve effective medical cost control through the Labor
Code.�).
37 Id.
38 Id.
39
Id. at 412 n.22.
40 Courts
in other jurisdictions have split on this issue. Some agree. Slack v.
Kelleher, 104 P.3d 958, 967 (Idaho 2004); Stanley v. Walker, 906
N.E.2d 852, 857-858 (Ind. 2009); Martinez v. Milburn Enters., 233 P.3d
205, 222-223 (Kan. 2010); Robinson v. Bates, 857 N.E.2d 1195, 1200-1201
(Ohio 2006). Others do not. Helfend v. S.
Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 69 (Cal. 1970); Wills v.
Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1030 (Ill. 2008); Bozeman v. State, 879 So.
2d 692, 701-702 (La. 2004); Covington v. George, 597 S.E.2d 142, 144-145
(S.C. 2004); Acuar v. Letourneau, 531
S.E.2d 316, 322-323 (Va. 2000); Leitinger v.
DBart, Inc., 736 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Wis.
2007).
41 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code
� 41.0105.
42 Franka v.
Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 393 (Tex. 2011).
43
See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 746
(Tex. 2003) (holding that the adverb �ordinarily� in the phrase �a person who
would ordinarily receive or be entitled to receive a salary, fee, or other
remuneration for administering care� modifies both �receive� and �be entitled to
receive�).
44 478 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1972).
45 Id. at 435.
46
Id. at 435-436.
47 Id. at 437.
48 Id.
49 226 S.W.3d 409, 412 n.22 (Tex.
2007).
50
Petitioner�s Brief on the Merits at 8 n.2 (emphasis
omitted).
51
Daughters of Charity, 226 S.W.3d at
412.
52
Id. at 412 n.22.
53 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code
� 18.001(b).
54 Arango v.
Davila, Nos. 13-09-00470-CV, 13-09-00627-CV, 2011 WL 1900189, at *9 (Tex.
App.�Corpus Christi May 19, 2011, no pet. h.); Frontera Sanitation, L.L.C. v. Cervantes, No.
08-08-00330-CV, 2011 WL 1157559, at *5 (Tex. App.�El Paso Mar. 30, 2011, no pet.
h.); Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Delgado, 335 S.W.3d 689, 392 (Tex. App.�Amarillo 2011, no pet. h.);
Pierre v. Swearingen, 331 S.W.3d 150, 155-156 (Tex. App.�Dallas 2011, no
pet. h.); Tate v. Hernandez, 280 S.W.3d 534, 540-541 (Tex. App.�Amarillo
2009, no pet.); Matbon, Inc. v. Gries, 288 S.W.3d 471, 481-482 (Tex. App.�Eastland 2009,
no pet.).
55 Tex. R. Evid. 402.
56
E.g., State v. Wood Oil Distrib.,
Inc., 751 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. 1988) (�[T]he introduction of evidence on
[non-compensable] damages . . . is improper
as a matter of law . . . .�); Interstate Northborough P�ship v. State, 66 S.W.3d 213, 220 (Tex. 2001)
(same).
57
Wills v. Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1031-1032 (Ill. 2008);
Covington v. George, 597 S.E.2d 142, 144-145 (S.C. 2004); Leitinger v. DBart,
Inc., 736 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Wis. 2007).
58 Tex. R. Evid. 403 (�Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.�).
59 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code
� 41.012.
60 Texarkana Mem�l
Hosp., Inc. v. Murdock, 946 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Tex. 1997).
61
Id. at 840-841.
62 Id. at 841.
63 Tex. Gov�t Code � 311.021.
64 Arango v. Davila, Nos. 13-09-00470-CV,
13-09-00627-CV, 2011 WL 1900189 (Tex. App.�Corpus Christi May 19, 2011, no pet.
h.); Frontera Sanitation, L.L.C. v.
Cervantes, No. 08-08-00330-CV, 2011 WL 1157559 (Tex. App.�El Paso Mar. 30,
2011, no pet. h.); Irving Holdings, Inc. v. Brown, 274 S.W.3d 926 (Tex.
App.�Dallas 2009, pet. denied); Gore v. Faye, 253 S.W.3d 785 (Tex.
App.�Amarillo 2008, no pet.).

———
Haygood v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. 2011) — verbatim text extracted from the Texas judiciary's own portal (HTML media): https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=df93d70a-14d5-4894-9759-5722f609d01b&coa=cossup&DT=OPINION&MediaID=4ea67184-1a55-49ea-8703-74a0cf904480 (sha256 5938ea8d70c2db9f0c4eb5d1e5de6c9815e69fe27d878c7d799f8dc3db0cee90; double-fetch byte-verified; layout whitespace normalized, no textual edits; Word-export preamble cut at the court banner). Docket 09-0377; case page https://search.txcourts.gov/Case.aspx?cn=09-0377&coa=cossup. Loaded 2026-08-05 for the Texas Evidence Command Center case layer; treatment statements on surfaces carry their as-of date — this corpus is not a citator and says so.

Verbatim from the official publication; the only normalization is removal of the publisher's page headers. Verify against the official source for filing-critical use — court publications change without notice.